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The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey
Andrew Rosser
Abstract
This paper presents a critical survey of the literature on the ‘resource curse’, focusing on
three main questions: (i) are natural resources bad for development?; (ii) what causes the
resource curse?; and, (iii) how can the resource curse be overcome? In respect of these
questions, three observations are made. First, while the literature provides considerable 
evidence that natural resource abundance is associated with various negative development
outcomes, this evidence is by no means conclusive. Second, existing explanations for the
resource curse do not adequately account for the role of social forces or external political
and economic environments in shaping development outcomes in resource abundant 
countries, nor for the fact that, while most resource abundant countries have performed
poorly in developmental terms, a few have done quite well. Finally, recommendations for
overcoming the resource curse have not generally taken into account the issue of political
feasibility. More generally, it is argued that the basic problem with the literature is that
researchers have been too reductionist – they have tended to explain development 
performance solely in terms of the size and nature of countries’ natural resource 
endowments. A consensus is emerging that various political and social variables mediate the
relationship between natural resource wealth and development outcomes. But rather than
acknowledge that these variables are shaped by a range of historical and other factors in
each case, scholars have tended to see them as determined by the natural resource base.
Put differently, scholars have been asking the wrong question: rather than asking why 
natural resource wealth has fostered various political pathologies and in turn promoted poor
development performance, they should have been asking what political and social factors
enable some resource abundant countries to utilise their natural resources to promote
development and prevent other resource abundant countries from doing the same.
Keywords: natural resources; civil war; democracy; economic growth
Andrew Rosser is a Fellow in the Governance Team. This paper was written for the
Development Research Centre on the Future State and was conceived in conjunction with
the Centre’s Director, Mick Moore.
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1 Introduction
Prior to the late 1980s, the conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between 
natural resource abundance and development was that the former was advantageous for
the latter. In the 1950s, for instance, geographer Norton Ginsburg argued that: ‘The 
possession of a sizable and diversified natural resource endowment is a major advantage to
any country embarking upon a period of rapid economic growth’ (as cited in Higgins 1968:
222). Similar views were also expressed by mainstream economists during this period (see,
for instance, Viner 1952 and Lewis 1955). In the 1960s, the prominent development theorist
Walter Rostow (1961) went further, arguing that natural resource endowments would
enable developing countries to make the transition from underdevelopment to industrial
‘take-off’, just as they had done for countries such as Australia, the United States, and
Britain. In the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberal economists such as Bela Balassa (1980), Anne
Krueger (1980) and P.J. Drake (1972) put forward similar arguments, with the former, for
instance, arguing that natural resources could facilitate a country’s ‘industrial development by
providing domestic markets and investible funds’ (1980: 2). A number of radical economists
challenged these views prior to the late 1980s, arguing that the structure of the global
economy and the nature of international commodity markets put developing countries that
were reliant on natural resource exports at a serious disadvantage (Singer 1950; Prebisch
1950). But theirs was a minority view – in general natural resources were seen as a blessing
for developing countries.
Since the late 1980s, there has emerged a sizeable scholarly literature that has challenged
this conventional wisdom. Rather than a blessing, this literature has suggested that natural
resource abundance (or at least an abundance of particular types of natural resources)
increases the likelihood that countries will experience negative economic, political and social
outcomes including poor economic performance, low levels of democracy, and civil war. This
literature has been extremely influential: the idea that natural resources are bad for
development is now widely accepted by researchers and officials at the major international
financial institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Bannon and
Collier 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Davis et al. 2003; Leite and Weidmann
1999; Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001: Isham et al. 2002; Eifert et al. 2003; Gelb and Associates
1988), as well as by many NGOs (see, for instance, Save the Children 2003; Oxfam 2002).
So influential has this literature been that the conventional wisdom now is arguably the
exact opposite of what it was prior to the late 1980s.
This paper presents a critical survey of this literature on the ‘resource curse’, focusing in 
particular on the three main questions that this literature addresses: (i) are natural resources
bad for development? (ii) what causes the resource curse? and (iii) how can the resource
curse be overcome? In respect of these questions, I make three specific observations. First,
while the literature provides considerable evidence that natural resource abundance is 
associated with various negative development outcomes, this evidence is by no means 
conclusive. Second, existing explanations for the resource curse do not adequately account
for the role of social forces or external political and economic environments in shaping
development outcomes in resource abundant countries, nor for the fact that, while most
resource abundant countries have performed poorly in developmental terms, some – such as
Botswana, Indonesia, Chile, Norway, Australia, Canada, and Malaysia (Stevens 2003: 8) –
have done quite well. Finally, recommendations for overcoming the resource curse have not
generally taken into account the issue of political feasibility.
More generally, I suggest that the basic problem with the literature as it stands is that most
researchers who have worked on the resource curse have been reductionist in their
approach – that is, they have explained development performance solely in terms of the size
and nature of countries’ natural resource endowments. A consensus is emerging that 
various political and social variables mediate the relationship between natural resource
wealth and development outcomes but rather than acknowledge that these variables are
shaped by a range of historical and other factors in each case, scholars have tended to see
them as determined by the natural resource base. Put differently, scholars have been asking
07 
IDS WORKING PAPER 268
the wrong question: rather than asking why natural resource wealth has fostered various
political pathologies and in turn promoted poor development performance, they should
have been asking what political and social factors enable some resource abundant countries
to utilise their natural resources to promote development and prevent other resource 
abundant countries from doing the same (Schrank 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). I 
conclude therefore that researchers should give greater attention to the latter question in
their forthcoming work, not just because doing so will enhance our understanding of when
natural resource abundance is associated with poor development outcomes but because it
will also generate useful policy recommendations for addressing the resource curse.
Before beginning the survey, it is worth making two preliminary points. The first is that the
literature on the resource curse in fact consists of three separate sub-literatures: on the
relationship between natural resource abundance and economic performance; on the 
relationship between natural resource abundance and civil war; and on the relationship
between natural resource abundance and political regimes. The notion of a resource curse
was initially associated with the first of these sub-literatures because this sub-literature
emerged well before the others (see Ross 1999 for a review). But as the other two sub-
literatures have emerged and developed, the second in response to Collier and Hoeffler’s
seminal study (1998) and the third in response to studies such as Wantchekon (1999) and
Ross (2001a), the resource curse has become seen as a multi-dimensional phenomenon,
involving not simply poor economic performance but also civil war and authoritarianism. For
this reason, the paper endeavours to survey all three of these sub-literatures. 
The second point is that the term ‘natural resources’ is defined variably throughout the 
literature. Some scholars have defined the term in terms of particular commodities – e.g.
oil, minerals, forest resources, and agricultural crops. Others have defined it in terms of the
abundance of land or the size of the primary sector. At the same time, there is some 
difference among scholars in the first group about which commodities can be considered
natural resources – some, for instance, include agricultural crops while others do not. It
would be impractical in a short survey like this to explain how all authors have defined this
term. Hence, I distinguish simply between those studies that examine the developmental
effects of natural resources in general (however specifically defined) and those that examine
the developmental effects of a particular resource – e.g. oil or minerals.
2 Are natural resources bad for 
development?
As noted above, the literature on the resource curse has presented considerable evidence to
suggest that natural resources are bad for development. This section reviews this evidence. It
is organised according to sub-literature for the sake of clarity.
l Economic performance: A large number of studies have presented evidence to 
suggest that natural resource abundance, or at least an abundance of particular natural
resources, reduces economic growth. Wheeler (1984), for instance, found that within
sub-Saharan Africa, countries that were rich in minerals grew more slowly than those
that were not rich in minerals during the 1970s. Similarly, Gelb and Associates (1988)
found that mineral economies experienced a more serious deterioration in the 
efficiency of domestic capital formation during the boom period of 1971–1983 than
non-mineral economies, leading to negative growth in hard mineral economies and
dramatically reduced in oil exporting economies (see also Auty 1993). Sachs and
Warner (1995) examined the experiences of a large and diverse set of natural resource
economies between 1970 and 1989 and found that natural resource abundance was
negatively correlated with economic growth. Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Gylfason
et al. (1999) produced similar results, also using large datasets. Auty (2001a) found that
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the per capita incomes of resource-poor countries grew at rates two to three times
higher than resource abundant countries between 1960 and 1990. Neumayer (2004)
examined whether natural resource abundance had a negative effect on economic
growth if one measured growth in terms of ‘genuine income’ – that is, GDP minus
the depreciation of produced and natural capital – rather than GDP. He found that it
did. 
Other scholars have presented evidence to suggest that the economic problems of
resource abundant countries have gone beyond poor levels of economic growth.
Nankani (1979), for instance, found that mineral economies performed relatively poorly
in terms of agricultural growth, export diversification, and inflation compared to 
non-mineral economies and were more likely to be characterised by poor savings 
performance, greater technological and wage dualism, high unemployment, high
external indebtedness, and high export earnings instability. Wood and Berge (1997)
found that resource abundant countries were less likely to export manufactured goods
than resource poor countries. Leite and Weidmann (1999) found that natural resource
abundance tends to worsen corruption. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) found that 
savings rates are on average lower in resource abundant countries than in resource
poor countries. Finally, Ross (2003a) found that oil wealth and non-fuel mineral
wealth are associated with bad outcomes for the poor in terms of poverty and human
development levels.
l Civil war: The literature also contains numerous studies that suggest that natural
resource abundance is associated with the onset of civil war and influences the 
duration and intensity of civil war – that is the number of battle-related deaths. After
examining the experiences of 98 countries and 27 civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler
(1998), for instance, found that natural resource abundance, defined in terms of the
ratio of primary exports to GDP, is a strong and significant determinant of the onset
of civil war, although they also found that the relationship between these variables
was curvilinear: initially, natural resource wealth increased the risk of civil war but after
a certain level of exports, it reduced this risk. In a subsequent study, they confirmed
this finding using a better data set (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). In a third study, they
examined the effect of natural resource abundance on different types of civil wars.
They found that natural resources increased the risk of both secessionist and non-
secessionist civil wars, but that the former were three times more likely to be 
associated with natural resources than the latter (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). 
Reynal-Querol (2002) conducted a similar study, focused on examining the association
between natural resources and the onset of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. Using
data from a sample of 138 countries between 1960 and 1995, she found that natural
resource abundance was an important variable in explaining the incidence of non-
ethnic civil wars and other forms of political violence but not the incidence of ethnic
civil wars. In their most recent paper, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) report on work
showing that natural resource wealth continues to exhibit a curvilinear relationship
with the onset of civil war even if a rent-based measure of natural resource 
abundance is substituted for their original export-based measure. However, they note
that this result is less significant than their earlier finding and that the rent-based
measure of natural resource abundance becomes insignificant, when the original
measure of natural resource wealth is included in the regression analysis as well.
Some researchers have also suggested that natural resource abundance may lengthen
the duration of civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), for instance, found that natural
resource abundance and the duration of civil wars also had a curvilinear relationship.
Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found that natural resource wealth was 
significantly and negatively correlated with the success of peace-building initiatives. As
Ross (2004a: 341) has noted, in so far as there is a link between the failure of such 
initiatives and the duration of civil wars, this finding suggests that natural resource
wealth is associated with longer wars. Fearon (2004) found that countries that are
rich in contraband resources such as opium, diamonds, or coca tend to experience
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longer civil wars and Ballantine (2003) found that natural resources served to prolong
civil wars in a selection of resource rich developing countries. 
Finally, as Ross (2004b: 45) has noted, several observers of Africa’s civil wars, have 
suggested that natural resources worsen the intensity of civil wars ‘by causing 
combatants to fight for territory that would otherwise have little value’. Ross (2004b)
himself found only very modest support for this idea: of the thirteen cases of civil war
he examined, natural resources only clearly increased the intensity of conflict in two
cases; in the eleven others, natural resources either had no effect or a mixed effect on
civil war intensity.
l Regime type: The resource curse literature also contains a number of studies that
suggest that natural resource abundance is associated with low levels of democracy.
Wantchekon (1999), for instance, examined data related to 141 countries between 1950
and 1990 and found that a one per cent increase in natural resource dependence, as
measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP, increased the probability of
authoritarian government by nearly 8 per cent. He also found that countries that were
rich in natural resources were more likely to experience failed or slow transitions to
democracy. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) presented similar findings in relation to
Africa, concluding that resource abundant countries in this region were more likely to
be authoritarian and experience breakdowns in democracy after the democratic
transition. Ross (2001a) investigated whether there was any variation in regime 
outcomes across different types of resource economy and different regions. After
examining data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997, he concluded that ‘a state’s
reliance on oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that this effect is
not caused by other types of primary exports; that it is not limited to the Arabian
peninsula, to the Middle East, or to sub-Saharan Africa; and that it is not limited to
small states’. 
While there is thus considerable evidence to support the notion of a resource curse, there
are several reasons to treat this evidence with caution. First, some scholars have suggested
that the findings of studies such as those cited above may not be robust to differences in
the measurement of natural resource abundance. In general, researchers have measured
natural resource abundance in terms of either the ratio of countries’ natural resource
exports to GDP or the ratio of countries’ natural resource exports to total exports. When
they have used different measures of natural resource abundance, their results have been
less clearly supportive of the notion of a resource curse. Stijns (2001), for instance found
that when natural resource abundance was measured in terms of levels of production and
reserves rather than exports, it did not have a significant influence on economic growth.
Similarly, Herb (2003) found that when natural resource abundance was measured in terms
of the percentage of rents in government revenues rather than levels of natural resource
exports, there is little support for the idea that there is a negative relationship between
natural resource abundance and the occurrence of democracy. De Soysa (2000) found that
when natural resource abundance was measured in terms of the level of natural resource
stock per capita, there was no relationship between the incidence of civil war and the over-
all level of natural resource abundance. Auty (2001a: 5) has pointed out that a number of
studies have used non-export based measures of natural resource abundance including
Gylfason et al. (1999) (who used labour force in the primary sector) and Auty (2001a) (who
used crop land per head), suggesting that the findings of these studies may be more robust
than critics of the resource curse hypothesis have suggested. But the question of whether
these findings are robust to broader changes in the measure of natural resource abundance
remains unresolved.
Second, it is not clear that the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP or the ratio of
natural resource exports to total exports are appropriate measures of natural resource
wealth. As we will see below, most studies that attempt to explain the resource curse 
suggest that the main problem with natural resource abundance is not that it leads to 
economic dependence on natural resources or a skewed export structure per se but that it
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creates rents – that is, excess earnings above normal profits. The existence of these rents is
in turn variously seen as contributing to negative development outcomes by encouraging
myopia and over-exuberance on the part of political elites, promoting damaging rent-
seeking behaviour by political elites and/or social actors, weakening state capacity to 
regulate and supervise the economy, empowering social elements that are opposed to
growth-promoting policies, or encouraging foreign intervention. As such, it could be argued
that rent-based measures of natural resource abundance provide a more useful basis for
making judgements about the existence or non-existence of a resource curse. Yet studies
that have used such measures – such as Herb (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2005) – have
so far provided only mixed support for the notion of a resource curse. 
Third, the finding that there is a strong relationship between natural resource abundance
and the onset and duration of civil war seems to be contingent on the use of a particular
civil war database. As Ross (2004a: 347–8) has pointed out, the studies that have presented
this finding have all used Collier and Hoeffler’s list of civil wars, yet scholars who have used
alternative lists of civil wars have generally come to different conclusions. He suggests 
several reasons for this related to the way in which civil wars are coded and civil war
duration is measured. In short, however, he suggests that Collier and Hoeffler’s database
‘may be biased in a way that overstates the impact of primary commodities’ (2004a: 342).
Fourth, a number of scholars have presented evidence that suggests that the main problem
vis-à-vis development outcomes in resource abundant countries is not natural resource
abundance per se – as many of the aforementioned studies suggest – but an abundance of
particular types of natural resources. At the same time, there is some disagreement, at least
in relation to civil war, about which natural resources are the main problem. Many
researchers have pointed to ‘point source’ natural resources – for instance, oil, minerals, and
plantation crops – as being particularly problematic. Isham et al. (2002), for instance, found
that countries that are rich in point source natural resources grew much more slowly during
the 1980s and 1990s than countries that are rich in ‘diffuse’ natural resources – for instance,
wheat and rice – and countries that are rich in cocoa and coffee. Similarly, Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003) found that an abundance of point source natural resources was 
significantly correlated with poor economic growth but that an abundance of diffuse natural
resources was not. Leite and Weidmann (1999) found that fuel and ores had a more 
negative effect on growth than agriculture (although a less significant negative effect than
food production). Ross (2003a) found that oil wealth and non-fuel mineral wealth are 
associated with bad outcomes for the poor but not agricultural resources. De Soysa (2000)
found that, while the incidence of civil wars was not related to total natural resource
wealth, it was strongly related to the level of mineral wealth, suggesting that point source
resources (specifically mineral resources) rather than natural resources in general are the
main problem as far as the onset of civil war is concerned. In a subsequent study, he found
that, among mineral-rich countries, oil exporters were particularly prone to civil war (De
Soysa 2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) have presented similar evidence on this point, 
showing that the size of countries’ primary commodity exports is not a significant 
determinant of the onset of civil wars but that their level of oil wealth is. Fearon (2005) has
provided further evidence to this effect. Finally, Ross’ (2001a) findings on the relationship
between oil wealth and democracy are also consistent with the emphasis on the negative
effects of point source resources. 
His findings in relation to civil war, however, are not. In Ross (2003b), he presents evidence
to suggest that it is ‘lootable’ resources such as diamonds (particularly alluvial diamonds) and
drugs (particularly opium and coca) rather than point source resources that are the most
likely to produce civil war. After analysing 12 civil wars and three minor conflicts that
occurred between 1990 and 2000, he found that, once income per capita was accounted
for, there was little difference in civil war rates between resource abundant countries in the
four main categories of natural resources – oil and gas, minerals, food crops, and non-food
crops. By contrast, he found that diamonds and drugs were strongly associated with the
incidence of civil war. Humphreys (2005) has also presented evidence to suggest that point
source resources are not the main problem vis-à-vis the onset of civil war, although his
11 
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findings also challenge Ross’s findings concerning lootable resources. According to his 
evidence, the main problem vis-a-vis the onset of civil war is the extent to which countries
are dependent on agricultural production. This effect, he notes, is independent of a 
country’s endowment of oil and diamonds, suggesting that the problem of resource
dependence is not simply one of the availability of point source or lootable resources but
also economic structure and how this shapes social relations (2005: 524–5). These findings
stand in marked contrast to those of Fearon, Fearon and Laitin, and De Soysa and suggest
that the issue of which types of natural resources are most likely to lead to the onset of civil
war has not yet been resolved.
Fifth, there is some evidence, albeit very limited, that natural resource wealth may in fact
have a beneficial, or at least neutral, effect on development performance. Davis (1995), for
instance, has shown that, by certain economic and social measures, mineral economies 
outperformed non-mineral economies between 1970 and 1991. These measures include
average GNP per capita and improvement in various social indicators such as infant 
mortality, life expectancy, calorie supply per capita, and the UN’s human development index.
None of this evidence is necessarily inconsistent with the findings of the aforementioned
studies because it focuses on social indicators rather than economic indicators such as
growth. But it does raise the question of whether economic growth in particular is the only
measure that we should examine in judging the economic performance of resource 
abundant countries. In addition, some scholars have produced evidence to suggest that 
natural resource abundance may not have a negative effect on the onset, duration or
intensity of civil war. In a study of the effects of oil dependence on regime failure and 
conflict in 107 developing countries between 1960 and 1999, Smith (2004), for instance,
found that oil wealth is associated with lower levels of civil war and anti-state protest.
Similarly, Sørli et al. (2005) found that oil dependence has not exercised a significant 
influence on the onset of civil war in the Middle East in recent decades. In respect of the
duration of civil war, Humphreys (2005) has presented evidence to suggest that natural
resource conflicts are more likely to end quickly while Ross (2003b) has presented evidence
to suggest that while lootable resources may serve to prolong non-separatist conflicts, non-
lootable resources serve to reduce non-separatist conflicts (see also Collier et al. 2004). In
respect of the intensity of civil war, Ballantine (2003) has suggested that natural resource
abundance has, in some cases, reduced the number of battle-related deaths during civil war.
Finally, while the studies above provide evidence that natural resource abundance – or at
least an abundance of particular types of natural resources – and various development 
outcomes are correlated with one another, they do not prove that the former causes the
latter. Those arguing in favour of the notion of a resource curse have merely inferred 
causality from the evidence of correlation. However, the direction of causation may in fact
run the other way. That is, it may be that civil war, for instance, causes economic
dependence on the natural resources sector by making it difficult for countries to attract
manufacturing investment. As Schrank (2004) puts it, natural resource dependence may be a
symptom of underdevelopment rather than the cause. Alternatively, the relationship
between natural resource dependence and various development outcomes may be entirely
spurious – that is, their correlation with one another may simply reflect the influence of an
unidentified third variable. Just as ice cream sales and the number of sunburn cases are
highly correlated because of changes in the seasons, rather than because ice cream 
consumption causes sunburn or vice versa, so it may be that natural resource abundance and
civil war, for instance, are correlated because a third variable (say, the weak rule of law) both
increases the risk of civil war and the difficulties countries face in attracting manufacturing
investment (Ross 2004a: 338). It will only be by examining more closely the causal 
mechanisms surrounding the resource curse that scholars will adequately resolve these
issues.
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2.1 Conclusion
In sum, then, while there is strong evidence to support the notion of a resource curse, it is
by no means conclusive. First, there are a variety factors related to the measurement of key
variables – especially, natural resource abundance and civil war outcomes – that raise doubts
about the findings of studies that are supportive of the resource curse hypothesis. Second,
it is unclear whether the resource curse (and its various dimensions) applies to all natural
resource economies or just certain ones. Different studies point in different directions on
this issue. Also there is ongoing debate among those who argue that particular natural
resources are the main problem about which natural resources are most pernicious, 
especially in relation to civil war. Third, some studies report findings contrary to the resource
curse hypothesis, even when they use the same measure of natural resource abundance as
those that support this hypothesis (as is the case, for instance, with some studies on the link
between natural resource abundance and the duration of civil war). Finally, these studies do
not illustrate conclusively that the direction of causation runs from natural resource wealth
to poor development outcomes rather than the other way around and that the relationship
between the two does not reflect the influence of an independent third variable.
3 What causes the resource curse?
Notwithstanding the inconclusive nature of the evidence in support of the notion of a
resource curse, many researchers have taken it as read that natural resource wealth leads to
bad development outcomes and have focused on trying to explain why this is the case,
either in general or in respect of particular regions or countries. The perspectives they have
offered vary considerably in terms of the causal mechanisms that they emphasise but can be
broadly grouped into seven categories: (i) economistic perspectives that emphasise economic
mechanisms; (ii) behaviouralist perspectives that emphasise emotional or irrational behaviour
on the part of political actors; (iii) rational actor perspectives that emphasise self-interested
behaviour on the part of political actors; (iv) state-centred perspectives that emphasise the
nature of the state; (v) social capital perspectives that emphasise the degree of social 
cohesion in countries; (vi) structuralist perspectives that emphasise the role of social groups
or socio-economic structure; and (vii) radical perspectives that emphasise the role of foreign
actors and structures of power at the global level. Explanations from all of these categories
feature in the sub-literature on natural resources and economic performance, with more
limited sets of explanations featuring in the sub-literatures on natural resources and civil war
and natural resources and regime type, reflecting greater academic engagement with issues
in the first sub-literature.  
3.1 Economic performance
Much early work on the economic performance of resource abundant countries suggested
that the causal mechanisms linking natural resource abundance and economic performance
were essentially economic in nature.1 Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1950), for instance, argued
that resource abundant countries had suffered from declining terms of trade over time, in
turn constraining their prospects for economic growth and development. Other scholars
such as Nurske (1958) and Levin (1960) argued that the problem for resource abundant
countries was that international commodity markets were inherently unstable and that any
instability within them could easily be transferred to domestic economies, in turn affecting
the reliability of government revenues and foreign exchange supplies and dramatically
increasing risks for private investors. Hirschman (1958) suggested that the problem was the
1 This and the following paragraph draw heavily on Ross (1999: 301–9).
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‘enclave’ nature of natural resource activities and the fact that multinational enterprises in
these sectors tended to repatriate profits rather than reinvest them in the local economy.
This, he said, made development difficult by restricting opportunities for the development
of backward and forward linkages between these activities and the rest of the economy.
Finally, in the early 1980s, several commentators argued that resource abundant countries
were susceptible to the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ – a condition whereby a resource boom
leads to appreciation of the real exchange rate and in turn damages manufacturing and
other tradable sectors (Corden and Neary 1982; Bruno and Sachs 1982).
Most of these explanations are now regarded with some scepticism. Subsequent studies of
trends in international commodity prices have suggested that while in overall terms 
international commodity prices have declined during the twentieth century, this has been
due largely to declines in the prices of commodities that are exported exclusively by 
developed countries or more or less exclusively by relatively successful developing countries –
the prices of commodities exported primarily by other developing countries have not
declined severely during this period. Similarly, several studies have suggested that export
price instability may be beneficial to exporters in so far as it can encourage higher levels of
private investment as exporters seek to protect themselves against future price shocks.
Other studies have suggested that export price instability does harm exporters but have not
clearly demonstrated that it harms exporters of primary commodities. There has been more
support in subsequent studies for Hirschman’s argument regarding economic linkages and
for the Dutch disease hypothesis. But these studies also suggest that governments can take
action to address these problems, in turn suggesting that these negative effects may 
operate more through political than economic mechanisms.2
For this reason, most recent work on the relationship between natural resource abundance
and economic performance has given much greater attention to the role of political 
variables in mediating this relationship. On the one hand, economists have increasingly
incorporated ideas from political science into their work on the resource curse, particularly,
although not exclusively, ideas from neoclassical political economy and the new 
institutionalism (Eifert et al. 2003; Rodrik 2003; Isham et al. 2002; Auty 2001c, 2001d;
Torvik 2002). On the other hand, political scientists have entered debates on the resource
curse, bringing with them analytical frameworks such as behaviouralism, public choice 
theory, Marxism, instititutionalism/statism, dependency and world systems theories, and 
fiscal sociology, all of which give central attention to the role of political factors in shaping
economic outcomes. For the most part, both economists and political scientists have agreed
that the immediate cause of poor economic performance in resource abundant countries
has been poor economic management. In particular, they have pointed to fiscal profligacy,
overvalued exchange rates, excessive protection, and inefficient use of resource windfalls as
being the main problems in this respect (Usui 1997; Anderson 1998; Mitra 1994; Karl 1997;
Ascher 1999). However, the broad consensus that poor economic management has been
the immediate cause of poor economic performance has not reflected consensus about the
underlying causes of this poor performance. Generally speaking, five main sets of
perspectives have emerged on this issue:
l Behaviouralist perspectives: These perspectives have suggested that natural resource 
abundance leads to various types of emotional or irrational behaviour on the part of
political elites, in turn contributing to poor economic policy-making and institutional
deterioration. In particular, it is argued, resource booms induce myopia, sloth, and/or
over-exuberance in political elites. Such arguments featured in the work of great 
political and economic theorists such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Smith and Mill and
in the work of economists such as Wallich (1960), Levin (1960), Nurske (1958) and
Watkins (1963). More recently, they have appeared in the work of economists such as
2 See Ross (1999: 301–7) references to these studies.
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Mitra (1994) and political scientists such as Krause (1995) (Ross 1999: 309). Mitra (1994:
295) has argued that resource booms produce a ‘tendency to optimism’ in countries
that benefit from such booms, in turn leading to excessive government spending.
Similarly, Krause (1995: 322) has suggested that natural resources lead to ‘wishful 
thinking’ among policy-makers in resource-rich countries. Behaviouralist ideas have also
featured in commentary on the resource curse in the popular media (e.g. Useem
2003).
l Rational actor perspectives: In contrast to behaviouralist perspectives, these 
perspectives portray political actors as rational utility-maximising individuals.
Accordingly, they have suggested that the problem with natural resource abundance is
not that it leads to irrational behaviour on the part of political actors but that it 
provides them with an opportunity to line their own pockets by engaging in rent-
seeking. Most scholars have suggested that members of the political elite are the main
problem in this respect. Ross (2001b), for instance, argues that when governments
receive windfalls from a resource boom, rational political elites will take the 
opportunity to either directly seize the rents created by resource booms or gain 
control over the right to allocate them – a process he calls ‘rent-seizing’ (Ross 2001b).
In a similar vein, Ascher (1999) has suggested that resource abundant countries have
generally wasted their natural resources because political elites have tended to use
them to pursue various programmatic and political objectives including financing 
controversial development programs, providing economic benefits to particular groups,
capturing rents for the government treasury, creating rent-seeking opportunities in
order to secure private sector cooperation in relation to other objectives, gaining 
control over rent allocation, and evading accountability. Robinson et al. (2002) have
suggested that such rent-seeking behaviour is most likely to lead to negative economic
outcomes when resource booms are perceived to be temporary because political elites
will focus on maximising the rents that they can extract in the short-term. Where
resource booms are perceived to be permanent, they argue, political elites will be less
interested in short term rent-maximisation because permanent booms increase the
likelihood that they will stay in power and hence the gains that they can make by 
promoting long-term economic development. Even where booms are perceived to be
permanent, however, Robinson et al. (2002) suggest that economic outcomes are 
likely to be negative because political elites will still have an incentive to engage in
inefficient redistribution of economic resources in order to influence elections.3 Other
scholars, however, have suggested that social actors are more to blame for the
increased rent-seeking. Torvik (2002), for instance, has argued that natural resource
abundance increases the rewards that social actors can gain from rent-seeking, and in
turn provides them with greater incentive to engage in such behaviour.
l State-centred perspectives: These perspectives suggest that natural resource 
abundance leads to poor economic performance not by influencing the behaviour of
political elites or social actors but by influencing the state’s capacity to promote 
economic development. Numerous scholars, for instance, have pointed to the 
problems associated with so-called ‘rentier’ states – that is, states that receive regular
and substantial amounts of ‘unearned’ income in the form of, for instance, taxes on
natural resource exports or royalties on natural resource production (Mahdavy 1970;
First 1974; Skocpol 1982; Beblawi 1987; Luciani 1987; Tanter 1990; Chaudhry 1994;
Vandewalle 1998; Gunn 1993). Because these states have large amounts of unearned
income to spend, it is argued, they tend to develop greater capacity in distributive
functions such as social welfare, education, and health and productive functions –
3 The main exceptions, according to Robinson et al. (2002), will be countries that have strong political and 
economic institutions.
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state-owned enterprise sectors are typically quite large in rentier states – than in 
functions related to the regulation and supervision of the economy and domestic
taxation (Garaibeh 1987; Chaudhry 1994). As Luciani (1987: 74) has put it, rentier states
do ‘not need to formulate anything deserving the appellation of economic policy: all
[they need] is an expenditure policy’. Karl (1997), Moore (2000, 2004), Auty (2001c,
2001d), and Auty and Gelb (2001) have presented similar analyses to rentier state 
theorists using slightly different terminology and concepts. Karl (1997: 16) for instance,
has argued that dependence on oil revenues leads to the emergence of ‘petro-states’,
that is, states that are geared towards the ‘political distribution of rents’ rather than
promotion of private investment, production and economic growth. The emergence of
petro-states, she suggests, is particularly likely where oil’s domination of the economy
coincides with the process of state formation (see also Vandewalle 1998: 33–8). In
these cases, the domination of oil gives the state a distributive character from its
inception, which, given the stickiness of institutions, becomes locked in. Moore (2000,
2004) has suggested that natural resource abundance leads to ‘bad governance’ in
developing countries because states’ financial autonomy means that they have little
accountability to their citizens. Auty (2001c, 2001d) and Auty and Gelb (2001) have
argued that natural resource abundance significantly increases the likelihood that
countries will develop predatory or factional oligarchic states rather than 
developmental ones for four main reasons: (i) the relative abundance of land and the
existence of natural resource rents in these countries creates a relatively high tolerance
by the poor majority for inequitable asset distribution and predatory rent extraction, in
turn decreasing the chances that the state will promote asset redistribution; (ii)
resource abundant countries are more likely to adopt protective trade policies rather
than developmental export-oriented policies because they are affected by the Dutch
disease; (iii) the large size of the resources sector means that it can support inefficient
inward-looking industrial sectors with transfers from the resources sector; and (iv)
resource abundant countries are more prone to ‘cumulative policy error’ (Auty and
Gelb 2001: 128–9).
l Historico-structuralist perspectives: These perspectives have suggested that natural 
resource abundance has pernicious economic effects not because of its effects on the
behaviour of political elites or the institutional capacity of the state but because of its
effect on the relative power of different social groups or classes. One group of
researchers, for instance, has suggested that natural resource abundance strengthens
well-connected business groups, in turn increasing pressure on governments to pursue
economic policies that serve the interests of these groups rather than the common
economic interest or the interests of the poor (Urrutia 1988; Broad 1995). In a similar
vein, several writers have suggested that one of the main reasons that Latin America
has performed less well than East Asia in terms of economic growth and poverty
reduction in recent decades is the effect of the two region’s natural resource 
endowments on their industrial policies. In Latin America, it is argued, natural resource
abundance led to the social and political dominance of landed and business elites that
had a vested interest in import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), hence preventing the
development of an externally competitive industrial sector, while in East Asia, resource
poverty meant that such elites did not exist, or at least did not exercise significant
political and social power, in turn making it easier for governments to shift away from
ISI towards export-oriented industrialisation and the development of an externally
competitive industrial sector (Mahon 1992; Auty 1995).
l Social capital perspectives: These perspectives have suggested that the problem 
with natural resource abundance, particularly an abundance of point source resources,
is that it undermines social cohesion and in turn limits the capacity of governments to
manage economic shocks. Ownership of point source resources resources, it is argued,
is typically concentrated in the hands of a few well-connected individuals or families, a
situation that creates severe social tensions. While these tensions may be masked 
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during periods of economic prosperity they come to the surface at times of economic
crisis. The result, it is argued, is that it is difficult to generate a social consensus around
a reformist strategy for coping with the crisis. In this context, powerful vested interests
typically win out and economic reform is stymied (Isham et al. 2002: 18–19; see also
Rodrik 1999 and Hausman 2003).
l These perspectives have suggested that natural resource
abundance makes a developing country a target for forced incorporation into the
global capitalist system – a system in which the interests of poor developing countries
are subordinated to those of wealthy developed countries – in turn impairing their
ability to pursue autonomous programs of economic development. Perelman (2003:
200), for instance has argued: ‘a rich natural resource base makes a poor country,
especially a relatively powerless one, an inviting target – both politically and militarily –
for dominant nations. In the case of oil, the powerful nations will not risk letting such
a valuable resource fall under the control of an independent government, especially
one that might pursue policies that do not coincide with the economic interests of
the great transnational corporations’. The result, dependency theorists suggest, is that
governments in resource abundant developing countries are permitted to engage in
corrupt and economically damaging activities so long as they remain loyal to the 
dominant nations and allow the natural resource wealth within their borders to be
looted by firms from wealthy countries (see also Bellamy et al. 2004 and Amin 2001). 
3.2 Civil war
Numerous scholars have also examined the causal mechanisms linking natural resource
abundance and four dimensions of civil war: the onset, duration, intensity and type of civil
war. Below we examine their arguments in relation to each of these dimensions in turn.
3.2.1 The onset of civil war
The debate over the causal mechanisms linking natural resource abundance and the onset of
civil war needs to be understood within the context of the wider debate over the causes of
civil war. In broad terms, this wider debate has centred on two main arguments. The first of
these, which reflects behaviouralist ideas, has emphasised the motives of rebel 
organisations. It has suggested that civil wars are caused by grievances stemming from
inequalities of wealth, limited political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions. The second
argument, which reflects ideas associated with the rational actor perspective, has 
emphasised the economic incentives and opportunities facing rebel organisations. In contrast
to the grievance argument, it assumes that rebellions are caused by greed – that is, by a
desire on the part of rebel leaders to enrich themselves and their followers. At the same
time, however, it suggests that civil wars are most likely where opportunities exist for rebels
to fund their activities. The former argument has appeared in some form in the work of
various political scientists (Regan 2003; Ross 2002) while the latter argument has been
advanced most prominently by the economists Collier and Hoeffler (2000) (see also Collier
2000).
In the former argument, natural resource abundance is important in so far as it serves to
exacerbate the grievances that lead to rebellion. Particularly important in this respect are
grievances stemming from various typical consequences of natural resource exploitation:
insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, inadequate job
opportunities, and labour migration. In the latter argument, natural resource abundance is
important because it constitutes a potential source of funding for rebel activities. More
specifically, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) suggest that it constitutes a potential source of
funding for the start up costs of initiating a rebellion such as buying arms and hiring soldiers.
The existence of primary commodities, it is argued, enables rebel groups to raise money by
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extracting and selling resources directly or extorting money from those who do. This is often
referred to as the ‘looting’ mechanism (Ross 2004b: 40).
A number of scholars have argued that neither the grievance nor looting arguments are
particularly helpful in understanding the onset of civil war in specific cases, at least not if
they are used on their own. After reviewing civil wars in several developing countries,
including several resource rich countries, Ballantine (2003: 260), for instance, concluded
that: ‘Economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or even the primary
cause of these armed conflicts; rather, to varying degrees, they interacted with socio-
economic and political grievances, inter-ethnic disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering
the outbreak of warfare’. In other words, she suggests that civil wars in resource abundant
countries are caused, to varying degrees, by some combination of looting and grievance,
rather than just one or the other. In a similar study of 13 civil wars that occurred in resource
abundant countries, Ross (2004b) found even less support for the looting and grievance
hypotheses. In none of these cases of civil war, he argued, did nascent rebel groups ever
fund the start up costs of conflict by extracting or selling natural resources or extorting
money from those who did, a finding that contradicts the looting hypothesis. Nor, he
argues, were complaints about land expropriation, environmental degradation, insufficient
employment opportunities or labour migration associated with the onset of non-separatist
civil wars in any of the cases, except possibly that of Sierra Leone. He did, however, find
some support for the notion that natural resource-related grievances can cause separatist
civil wars, an effect he labels the ‘separatist’ mechanism. 
Ross (2004b) suggests that rather than being caused by the looting or grievance 
mechanisms, civil wars in resource abundant countries are typically caused by various 
alternative mechanisms. The other causal mechanisms for which he finds some support in
his study are what he labels the ‘foreign intervention’ mechanism – a mechanism whereby
‘resource wealth increases the probability of civil war by increasing the probability of foreign
intervention to support a rebel movement’ – and the ‘booty futures’ mechanism – a 
mechanism whereby ‘resource wealth increases the probability of civil war by enabling rebel
groups to sell future exploitation rights to minerals they hope to capture’ (2004b: 57–8).
Both of these mechanisms are consistent with the idea that greed rather grievance is the
primary cause of civil war, but obviously not with the looting hypothesis. At the same time,
Ross also suggests that civil wars generally reflect the operation of two or more causal 
mechanisms operating at once rather than a single causal mechanism. In particular, he finds
that some combination of the two above mechanisms and the separatist mechanism
account for civil war in virtually all of the cases in his sample.
Other scholars, particularly those operating from a state-centred perspective, have argued
that civil wars in resource abundant countries are caused by state weakness rather than the
greed or grievances of individual armed actors. Auty (2004), for instance, has argued that
natural resources create the conditions for civil war through a two-stage process. In the first
stage, natural resource abundance leads to the emergence of predatory states which in turn
produces growth collapses, an argument that mirrors his earlier analysis concerning the
economic performance of resource abundant states (discussed earlier). This growth collapse,
he suggests, is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition, for the onset of civil war.
Whether civil war then occurs is a function of the type of natural resources that a country
has, specifically whether they are point source or diffuse resources and lootable or non-
lootable. According to Auty, point source resources are more likely to produce conflict than
diffuse resources because they concentrate rents on the government and thereby 
encourage military opposition from disaffected groups; and lootable resources are more
likely to produce conflict than non-lootable resources because they can be relatively easily
captured by secessionist rebels or warlords, especially if they are located near porous 
borders. Similarly, Pearce (2005: 180) has argued that civil war in Colombia in the 1990s
reflected poor economic governance and exclusiveness on the part of the state. Until such
time as the Colombian state is fair and effective, she argues, its citizens are unlikely to ‘grant
it the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence’. And Silberfein (2004: 215) has argued
that the civil war in Sierra Leone is linked in part to ‘the collapse of the state, the 
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emergence of pervasive criminality among state and non-state actors along with the 
proliferation of small arms’.
A final perspective on the causes of civil war has been offered by scholars operating from a
dependency perspective. As noted earlier, dependency theorists have argued that natural
resource abundance turns developing countries into targets for forced incorporation into the
global capitalist system because rich countries desire cheap access to their resources to
maintain their own economic development and wealth. In their view, then, violent conflict
in resource abundant countries is best understood in terms of contests between rich states
over scarce natural resources, an argument often referred to as the ‘resource scarcity’ idea.
In essence, this argument is very similar to what Ross has labelled the ‘foreign intervention’
mechanism, although it is different in so far as it reflects certain assumptions (which 
probably does not share) about the way in which the world works.
3.2.2 Duration and intensity
The sub-literature on natural resources and civil war also contains analyses of the causal
mechanisms linking natural resource wealth, on the one hand, and the duration and 
intensity of civil wars, on the other. In relation to the duration of civil wars, the sub-
literature suggests that natural resource wealth may serve to prolong civil wars in four ways:
(i) by enabling the weaker side in a conflict to raise funding through looting and thereby
sustain itself over time (Ross 2004b; Ballantine 2003); (ii) by giving combatants an incentive
to avoid a peace deal (Fearon 2004; Sherman 2000; Ballantine 2003); (iii) in the case of
separatist conflicts, by reducing the likelihood that governments will stick to a peace deal
that gives a region fiscal autonomy (Fearon 2004; Ross 2004b); and (iv) by enabling the
weaker side in a conflict to raise money by selling future exploitation rights to minerals that
they want to control (Ross 2004b). There is some debate about the extent to which 
mechanism (ii) is valid. Ross (2004b), for instance, has argued that analysts should treat
claims about the importance of mechanism (ii) with caution because, in his study, while the
incentive to avoid a peace deal appeared to lengthen two conflicts, it also appeared to
shorten three other conflicts and have no effect in a number of other conflicts. There
appears to be less disagreement, however, about the merits of the other causal 
mechanisms. In relation to the intensity of civil wars, Ross (2004b) has suggested that 
natural resource wealth may increase the casualty rate during civil wars by (i) ‘causing 
combatants to fight for resource-rich territory that would otherwise have little value’
(2004b: 45); and (ii) ‘giving the government an incentive to react to small challenges with
unusually harsher countermeasures’ (2004b: 61). However, several scholars have suggested
that natural resources may in some cases reduce the intensity of conflict by encouraging
combatants to cooperate in resource exploitation (Keen 1998; Ballantine 2003; Ross 2004b).
Ballantine (2003: 269) notes that this has occurred in Sierra Leone and the DRC, for
instance, where ‘the impossibility of any one side securing a full monopoly over lootable
resources has … offered … a compelling incentive for collusion rather than competition’.
Again, these causal mechanisms seen as affecting the duration and intensity of civil wars
focus on the economic incentives facing combatants and, as such, are broadly consistent
with the view that greed rather than grievance is the cause of civil wars.
3.2.3 Type of civil war
Finally, the sub-literature on natural resources and civil war also contains analyses of the
causal links between different types of natural resource and different types of violent 
conflict. Le Billon (2001), for instance, has distinguished between four different types of
natural resource: point source resources that are close to the capital; point source resources
that are distant from the capital; diffuse resources that are close to the capital; and diffuse
resources that are distant from the capital. Each of these types of natural resource, he 
suggests, is associated with a different type of violent conflict. There are two dynamics at
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work. First, whereas point source resources can be easily captured by a single group because
they are concentrated in particular locations, diffuse resources are harder for any single
group to capture because they are spread out over a broad geographical area. Second,
whereas natural resources that are close to the capital can be easily held by the 
government, resources that are distant from the capital are easier for rebels to capture.
Hence, he concludes that point source resources that are close to the capital will tend to be
associated with conflicts over state control; point source resources that are distant from the
capital will tend to be associated with separatist conflicts; diffuse resources that are close to
the capital will tend to be associated with rebellions and rioting; and diffuse resources that
are distant from the capital will tend to be associated with warlordism. 
By contrast, Ross (2003b) has presented evidence based on a series of case studies to 
suggest that the incidence of particular types of civil war depends largely on the extent to
which natural resources are lootable. Unlootable resources, he says, are more likely to 
produce separatist conflicts while lootable resources are more likely to produce non-
separatist conflicts. The reason for this, he suggests, is that extraction of unlootable
resources relies heavily on skilled labour and capital while extraction of lootable resources
relies heavily on unskilled labour. Hence, unlootable resources tend to benefit skilled workers
from outside the region in which the resources are located, extraction firms and the 
government rather than local people and, in turn, fuel grievances among local people.
Lootable resources, by contrast, tend to benefit local people, including the local poor.
3.3 Regime type
The debate over the causal mechanisms linking natural resource abundance and regime type
has centred on the relative merits of four explanations. The first of these, which reflects a
state-centred perspective (and in particular the notion of a rentier state), suggests that 
natural resource wealth hinders democracy because governments in resource-rich countries
are able to use government spending and low taxes to reduce pressures for
democratisation. Lam and Wantchekon (2003), for instance, have argued that the economic
benefits of resource booms are typically concentrated on political elites, in turn enabling
them to maintain support and consolidate their power. In authoritarian political systems, this
means more limited scope for democratic change. Similar arguments have been made by
Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) in relation to resource abundant states in Africa, Beblawi
(1987) and Luciani (1987) in relation to oil states in the Middle East, and Ross (2001a) in 
relation to oil states in general. The second explanation, which is also broadly consistent
with the state-centred perspective, suggests that natural resource wealth hinders 
democracy by enabling governments in resource-rich countries to spend more on internal
security. With stronger internal security forces, it is argued, governments can limit the scope
for political opponents to organise and challenge them (Ross 2001a; Jensen and
Wantchekon 2004). The third explanation builds on rational actor analyses of the causes of
civil war and focuses on the link between civil wars and political regimes As Jensen and
Wantchekon (2004: 822) have argued, the central idea of this explanation is that natural
resource wealth can serve to consolidate particular regimes in power, in turn making it
rational for opposition groups to pursue power through extra-constitutional means (i.e.
war). This in turn, they argue, ‘could result in a dictatorship by the opposition party or the
incumbent party’ depending on the outcome of the war. The final explanation, which is
broadly consistent with the historico-structuralist perspective, suggests that natural resource
wealth hinders democracy by preventing the social and cultural changes that facilitate
democratisation such as rising education levels and occupational specialization. Ross (2001a)
has labelled this the ‘failed modernisation’ effect.4 Herb (2003) and Clark (1997) have 
4 Herb (2003) and Clark (1997) have challenged this explanation, suggesting that natural resource wealth may in
fact lead to various social and cultural changes consistent with ‘modernisation’. These in turn may, on balance,
outweigh any negative effects of resource wealth.
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challenged this explanation, suggesting that natural resource wealth may in fact lead to 
various social and cultural changes consistent with ‘modernisation’. These in turn may, on
balance, outweigh any negative effects of resource wealth. 
3.4 Commentary
Our purpose here is not to resolve these debates concerning the link between natural
resource wealth, on the one hand, and economic performance, civil war, and regime type
on the other. To do so would require much more space than is available here and would, in
any case, be an impossible task given our level of knowledge concerning the effects of
natural resource wealth. Despite, this, however, we think that a few comments are in order.
First, none of the perspectives mentioned above adequately addresses the role of social
forces in shaping development outcomes in resource abundant countries. In state-centred
and behaviouralist perspectives, the general assumption is that policy elites in resource
abundant countries have a high degree of autonomy from domestic social groups because
states are financially independent of them. Because domestic social groups do not have to
fund the state, it is argued, they tend to make few demands of it. However, as Okruhlik
(1999) has illustrated, while the financial independence of states in resource abundant 
countries may mean that policy elites rarely face social pressure in relation to their taxation
policies, they frequently face serious social pressures in relation to spending decisions. Just
because citizens do not have to make financial sacrifices to fund their governments, she
argues, does not mean that they have no interest in how their governments use their
resources nor that they are unwilling to engage in collective action to influence spending
decisions. Furthermore, the nature of state institutions in resource-rich countries is often
shaped by long-standing social patterns and dynamics, particularly in cases where natural
resource domination of the economy occurred after the state was already formed. As
Okruhlik (1999: 309) has put it in relation to oil producing states: ‘Life did not begin, as
many imply, in 1973 with the quadrupling of oil prices. Rather, oil enters into an ongoing
process of development and into a constellation of identities. The extent to which social
forces were corporate groups before oil has indeed proven important.’ The case of Iran in
the late 1970 makes this clear: notwithstanding the rentier effects of oil wealth, domestic
social groups were able to capture the state in this country by making appeals to primordial
sentiments such as religious morality (see, for instance, Skocpol 1982; Shambayati 1994).
These points suggest that if we are to properly understand why states in resource abundant
countries perform poorly in economic terms, are undemocratic, and are prone to violence,
we need to give greater attention to the nature of the social contexts in these countries
than behaviouralist or state-centred perspectives allow.
At the same time, we also need to have a better understanding of the characteristics of
societies in resource abundant countries than that which underpins rational actor and social
capital perspectives. Scholars operating from a rational actor perspective such as Torvik
(2002) and Collier and Hoeffler (1998) suggest that societies in resource abundant countries
are composed of disconnected rational utility maximising individuals who only join together
into organised groups to advance common economic interests. The problem with this
approach is that it tells us nothing about the structural characteristics of societies – that is
whether, groups are defined primarily in class, ethnic or religious terms and what the 
relationship between different social elements is. Isham et al.’s (2002) social capital
approach suggests that there are greater social cleavages in resource abundant countries
than in other countries because some groups have greater access to natural resource rents
than others. But again it does nothing to tell us whether these groups are class, ethnic or
religion-based. Historico-structuralists provide the most sophisticated analysis of the role of
social forces in shaping developmental outcomes in resource abundant countries but tend to
be too class-centred. As Delacroix (1980) has observed, social groups in resource abundant
countries tend to be defined more in ethnic and religious terms than class terms because,
with access to large amounts of unearned income, governments in these countries have not
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generally needed to promote capitalist production in order to survive. In some cases, of
course, class is a significant feature of social structures in resource abundant countries
because of historical processes that precede natural resource domination of the economy
(Rosser 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2003). But in other cases it clearly is not. Whatever the case,
however, scholars need to be more aware of the ways in which natural resource wealth
affects social structure and in turn development performance.
Second, none of the above sets of perspectives adequately addresses the way in which
countries’ external environments shape development outcomes in resource abundant 
countries. Although some non-dependency scholars such as Ross (2004b) have pointed to
the role of foreign intervention in creating conflict in resource abundant countries, only
dependency theorists have given consistent attention to the role of external factors in 
mediating the relationship between natural resource wealth and development outcomes –
in general, development outcomes are seen as being solely a product of domestic political
factors. At the same time, dependency explanations offer an overly simplistic view on this
matter. The point here is that, while dependency theorists are probably right to assert that
natural resource abundance makes countries a target for forced incorporation into the 
global capitalist system, they are wrong to imply that this incorporation always has negative
developmental consequences. For instance, as a number of scholars have illustrated, the
incorporation of several resource abundant East Asian countries – specifically, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand – into the global political economy was economically beneficial for
them for several reasons. Because these countries had a high degree of geo-strategic
importance, they benefited from generous foreign financial assistance and access to lucrative
markets. Because they were located close to Japan, they were able to take advantage of
the investment and export opportunities opened up by Japan’s periodic economic
restructuring (Stubbs 1994, 1999; Cumings 1987; Wallerstein 1999). Finally, these economic
opportunities in turn helped these countries deal with the after-effects of the 1970s
resource boom. Inflows of investment resources in the form of aid and FDI served to com-
pensate for the loss of investment resources caused by the collapse of international natural
resource prices. One of the main problems for resource-rich countries is that resource
booms can lead to a decline in economic activity in non-resource sectors, particularly those
that are export-oriented, leaving them unable to maintain growth in the post-boom period.
Inflows of investment resources in the form of aid and FDI during the 1980s and 1990s
helped Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand to avoid these problems by providing a motor to
drive their respective economies following the boom. In short, then, countries’ geo-political
and geo-economic environments are an important mediating factor in the relationship
between natural resource wealth and developmental performance and deserve greater
attention than they currently receive in the literature.
Finally, most of the above perspectives are highly deterministic. They tend to suggest that
resource abundant countries are more or less undifferentiated in terms of their economic
performance, propensity for civil war, and political regimes. They also suggest that these
negative development outcomes are ultimately the product of these countries’ resource
endowments. The problem with these suggestions is twofold. First, they do not comport
with the fact that there is considerable variation in the development outcomes experienced
by individual resource abundant countries: while many resource abundant countries have
performed poorly in economic terms, descended into violence, and developed authoritarian
regimes, some have done quite well in these respects. In economic terms, for instance,
countries such as Indonesia, Chile, Malaysia, and Botswana have done quite well in recent
years, notwithstanding (in the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia) the effects of the Asian 
economic crisis (Stevens 2003). Nor has any of these countries descended into civil war. All
are now democracies, at least in procedural terms. Second, these suggestions do not 
comport with apparent variation in the extent to which resource abundant countries suffer
from the various political pathologies that are seen as mediating the relationship between
natural resource abundance and development performance. For instance, not all resource
abundant countries have developed predatory, factional or rentier states, Malaysia and
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Botswana again being obvious exceptions.5 Nor have all resource abundant countries 
suffered from problems of corruption and rent-seeking to the same extent as most
resource abundant countries, with Botswana being the obvious exception to the general
pattern (Acemoglu et al. 2003). Some such as Indonesia clearly have suffered from 
corruption and rent-seeking but the economic impact of this has not been so severe as to
prevent rapid economic growth (MacIntyre 2003). It seems reasonable to believe that social
capital is much lower in countries like Sierra Leone and Angola that have experienced
severe violent conflict than it is in many other resource abundant countries.
Some scholars have argued that, in examining the relationship between natural resource
wealth, mediating political variables, and development outcomes, they are examining 
general tendencies rather than iron laws and that their analyses therefore do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of variation in the value of mediating variables or in development
outcomes (Auty and Gelb 2001; Auty 2001c). This is a fair point. But in failing to explain this
variation, they obscure the factors that have enabled some resource abundant countries to
make good use of their resource endowments and prevented others from doing the same.
This in turn has implications for extent to which this analysis can aid policy development. In
trying to develop strategies to help resource abundant countries overcome the resource
curse, it is surely more useful to know why some resource abundant countries have done
better than others than why resource abundant countries have done less well on average
than resource poor countries. Using resource poor countries’ experiences as the point of
comparison tells us little that is useful about how resource abundant countries can escape
the resource curse. It either leads us down the path of finding ways to prevent resource rich
countries from having access to their resource wealth or promoting various institutional,
social or behavioural reforms aimed at improving economic and conflict management when
it is simultaneously implied that any initiatives in these areas are likely to fail because of the
political and social effects of resource wealth.
A few scholars have explicitly recognised the variation in individual resource rich countries’
development performance and sought to explain this variation in terms of differences in the
values of mediating political variables. There is little agreement, however, as to which 
mediating variables are most important in this respect. Several have emphasised the nature
of institutions, albeit different institutions. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003: 1804), for instance,
have argued that resource-rich countries with ‘good quality institutions’ – defined in terms
of the extent of the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, the level of government corruption,
and the risk of investment expropriation and contract repudiation – have achieved greater
rates of investment and, to a lesser extent, saving than resource-rich countries with poor
quality institutions. Similarly, Eifert et al. (2003) have emphasised regime type. More 
specifically, they suggest that mature democracies have performed better in terms of
managing oil rents than autocracies or factional democracies, because their higher levels of
transparency and accountability, lower levels of corruption, and stronger protection of civil
and political rights have translated into a higher capacity for long-term decision-making and
more stable economic policies. Snyder (2003) has suggested that resource rich countries’
respective abilities to avoid civil war may depend on the extent to which rulers are able to
construct and maintain institutions of extraction that give them control over the revenues
generated by natural resource abundance.
Other scholars have pointed to different mediating variables as being important. Jones
Luong and Weinthal (2001) have emphasised the way in which differences in the way in
which two variables – the extent to which a country has alternative sources of export 
revenue besides natural resource reserves and the extent to which there is political 
contestation over the basis for dispensing political power and economic patronage – 
influence the calculations of political elites. Chaudhry (1994) and Schrank (2004) have
5 This is explicitly acknowledged, for instance, by Auty and Gelb (2001). But most other scholars do not 
acknowledge this variation.
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emphasised the nature of class alignments. Chaudhry, for instance, has argued that oil
wealth constrained development in Iraq and Saudi Arabia by promoting the development of
states that had relatively high distributive and productive capacities but relatively low 
capacities for regulating private sector activity or mobilising taxation revenues. At the same
time, however, she argues that these states differed markedly in terms of their social bases.
The result of this difference in social bases, she argues, was that when economic crisis
struck in the 1980s, the two states went down different reform paths, in turn generating
different economic results. Schrank (2004) has presented evidence to suggest that countries
in which capitalist property relations have developed are more likely to use their natural
resource well than countries in which ethnic or religious divisions predominate. Finally,
Bevan et al. (1999) have explained Indonesia’s relatively strong economic performance 
compared to Nigeria’s prior to the late 1990s in terms of both ‘deep-rooted differences in
the structure of interest groups’ and the ‘happenstance of events’ and the way these have
shifted influence between competing policy cliques within the state.
Despite the disagreement over which variables are most significant in terms of mediating
the relationship between natural resource wealth and development performance, however,
this work arguably holds the greatest potential for producing the desired understanding of
the causes of poor economic performance in resource abundant countries, as well as the
conditions that have enabled some countries to escape this problem.
4 How can the resource curse be 
overcome?
The literature on the resource curse contains a wide variety of recommendations to help
resource abundant countries overcome the curse. Below, we examine the most significant
of these.
Many scholars have focused on the economic policy changes required to enable resource
abundant countries to overcome the resource curse. Several economists, for instance, have
emphasised the need for resource abundant countries to adopt sensible macroeconomic
policies and, in particular, avoid large foreign and domestic debts, accumulate budget 
surpluses, control inflation, and pursue competitive exchange rates (Usui 1997; Mikesell 1997;
Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001). These measures, it is argued, are likely to be particularly important
in terms of helping resource abundant countries avoid the Dutch disease (Usui 1997). A
number of other economists have emphasised the need for resource abundant countries to
diversify their economies so as to reduce their dependence on natural resources (Auty 1994;
Collier 2000). Yet others again have argued that resource abundant countries need to 
pursue an investment strategy whereby investments are made in accordance with their
absorptive capacity, all recurrent costs associated with new investments are taken into 
consideration, and investments are only made when the expected rate of return is 
considerably above alternative risk-free investments (Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001: 8). Some
economists and other social scientists have also recommended the use of stabilisation funds
– that is, funds aimed at reducing the impact of commodity price instability on the economy
– pointing to their successful use in countries such as Norway (Seymour 2000; Skancke
2003). But a few scholars have expressed doubt about the usefulness of these funds in
resource abundant countries that do not have strong traditions of transparent and 
accountable government (Davis et al. 2003). 
A second group of scholars has focused on trying to identify the political and social changes
that are required to overcome the resource curse. In their view, it is unlikely that economic
policy reforms will be introduced unless political and social environments in resource 
abundant countries are first transformed, although in many cases they recognise that this
transformation will be politically difficult and is unlikely in the short-term. Some scholars
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such as Mitra (1994: 294–5) have taken the behaviouralist line that governments in resource
abundant countries are unlikely to pursue policies that will overcome the resource curse
until there is a change in the mindset of political elites in these countries. In particular, he
suggests that these elites need to begin viewing commodity booms as temporary, not 
permanent, phenomena, so as to stem the euphoria that accompanies booms. Several
scholars operating from rational actor and state-centred perspectives have emphasised a
need for resource abundant countries to build state capacity and promote institutional
reform. Such processes, it is argued, will facilitate policy reform and prevent the growth 
collapses and misrule that can lead to violent conflict (Karl 1997; Ascher 1999; Auty 2001b,
2004; Pearce 2005). Karl (1997: 240), for instance, has argued that the ‘neoliberal 
preoccupation with shrinking the jurisdiction of the state’ as it has been applied to resource
abundant countries ‘ignores the crying need for strengthening its authority’. Rather than
trying to reduce the economic role of the state in resource abundant countries, she argues,
the focus should be on measures such as professionalising the civil service, reducing 
corruption, and democratisation (1997: 241). Similarly, Auty (2001b: 323) has argued that:
‘Economic policy success requires institutional reinforcement that encourages the growth of
a developmental state’. Arguing from a social capital perspective, Woolcock et al. (2001: 90)
have argued that such institutional initiatives need to be supported by measures to build
‘social capacity and political consensus’ in resource abundant countries. Only by doing so,
they suggest, will states in these countries develop the required ability to manage the 
conflicts caused by economic shocks.
A third group of scholars has argued in favour of bypassing the state, rather than trying to
strengthen it, by requiring resource abundant countries to distribute all their natural
resource revenues, or at least a substantial proportion of them, directly to citizens (Eifert et
al. 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). Such a policy, it is argued, would ‘minimise
opportunities for corruption and misappropriation, because windfall revenue would stay out
of the hands of public officials’ (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003: 80); and ‘reduce 
pressure for explosive spending followed by lock-in and fiscal crisis during downturns’ by
reducing the financial resources available to the state during booms (Eifert et al. 2003: 119).
Ross (2001b: 200) has suggested that, even if resource windfalls are directly transferred to
citizens, the state may still receive a significant share of them through their effect on 
taxation revenues, but nevertheless concedes that the policy is ‘plausible’.
A fourth group of scholars has suggested that resource abundant countries should privatise
their natural resource sectors. Ross (2001b: 200), for instance, has suggested that 
privatisation may forestall the problem of rent-seizing, although for various reasons he
argues that it may not be an appropriate strategy in relation to forest resources. Weinthal
and Jones Luong (2001) have argued that countries that sell their natural resource sectors to
domestic interests are more likely to develop sound taxation systems than those that either
do not privatise these sectors or sell them to foreign investors. This, they argue, is because
domestic investors have greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the state than foreign investors:
whereas the bargaining power of foreign investors declines once their capital and costs are
sunk, domestic investors maintain their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state because ‘both
need the other in order to survive, enabling them to reach a compromise or find that their
interests have converged over time’ (2001: 222). In this connection, they point to the 
different experiences of Russia and Kazakhstan, which sold their oil sectors to domestic and
foreign interests respectively: whereas ‘domestic oil companies are helping to foster the
development of an increasingly viable tax regime in Russia’, they argue, Kazakhstan’s tax
regime ‘has become increasingly volatile’ and overly reliant on foreign businesses (2001: 215).
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2001) have argued that these conclusions fit a broader range of
resource abundant developing countries, although Rosser (2004) has argued that they do
help to explain Indonesia’s success in overcoming the resource.
A fifth group of scholars has recommended that various actions could be taken at the 
international level to help resource abundant countries overcome the resource curse.
Attempts to control international commodity prices through international agreements have
repeatedly failed, so few scholars now see these as a solution (Ross 2001b; 199). At the
IDS WORKING PAPER 268
25 
same time, the main mechanisms created by international organisations to help resource
abundant countries cope with price shocks – the IMF’s Compensatory Financing Facility and
the European Commission’s Stabex Facility – never worked very well and are now dormant
(Bannon and Collier 2003: 10). Despite this, however, Bannon and Collier (2003: 10) have
argued that the IMF and the World Bank should consider redesigning existing tools or
designing new mechanisms to reduce the negative effects of price instability on resource
abundant countries. They also suggest that OECD countries should consider reducing 
subsidies to their own agricultural sectors, because such subsidies serve to exacerbate the
effects of international price falls on developing country producers. Shaxson (2005) has
argued that attempts to help resource abundant countries, particularly oil dependent 
countries, deal with price shocks should include revisions to the nature of contracts
between governments in these countries and international oil companies. Many 
developments in the oil sector, he points out, are governed by ‘production sharing 
agreements’ that are generally structured in such a way as to turn ‘a volatile oil price into an
even more volatile revenue stream for the producer country’ (2005: 321). Revising these
agreements so as to alter the way in which revenue volatility is shared between 
government and oil companies is, in his view, one way in which the negative effects of
volatility can be reduced. Finally, a number of scholars have also backed the use of
international certification processes such as the Kimberley Process for diamonds that are
aimed at reducing the economic incentives for violent conflict by restricting international
trade in various commodities (Collier 2000: 106; Auty 2004: 46; Bannon and Collier 2003:
13). Ballentine (2003: 274–9), however, has pointed to various problems with this approach
including the possibility that, as in the case of narcotics, they may be only partly effective in
stemming international trade; the strong likelihood that, in many cases, they will fail to
address the non-economic causes of the conflict; and the possibility that they may shift the
military balance in favour of government forces, intensifying violence in the short-term. 
4.1 Commentary
A brief comment on these recommendations is in order. A key problem with many of these
recommendations, particularly those that centre on policy, behavioural, institutional or social
changes at the domestic level, relates to their political feasibility. For the most part, these
recommendations follow on from analyses of the resource curse that posit a rather
deterministic relationship between natural resource abundance, various pathologies (e.g.
irrational behaviour by policy elites; rent-seeking by social groups; weak institutions), and
various negative developmental outcomes (poor economic performance, civil war, 
authoritarianism). It is thus unclear how the recommended changes might be brought about
– indeed, most analyses of the resource curse suggest that they cannot be, at least as long
as countries remain dependent on natural resources. It will only be by further exploring the
dynamics underpinning variation in resource abundant countries’ development performance,
that we are likely to uncover potential levers that might be employed to trigger the
required policy, behavioural, institutional or social changes. As noted earlier, scholars such as
Weinthal, Jones Luong, Ross, Snyder, and Schrank have started us on this course. Hopefully,
they and others will take this work further. In the meantime, it may therefore be more
profitable for those concerned about the resource curse to focus on promoting change at
the international level. The fact that the Kimberley Process was created within a couple of
years suggests that the political obstacles to achieving change at the international level may
be less severe than those at the domestic level. At the same time, the current shift towards
increasing aid flows to developing countries, particularly poor countries in Africa, bodes well
for any attempt to create new international financial mechanisms for helping poor countries
cope with international commodity price instability. 
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5 Conclusion
This paper has advanced four main arguments. First, while the literature on the resource
curse provides considerable evidence that natural resource abundance is associated with 
various negative development outcomes, this evidence is by no means conclusive. Second,
existing explanations for the resource curse do not adequately account for the role of social
forces or external political and economic environments in shaping development outcomes in
resource abundant countries, nor for the fact that, while most resource abundant countries
have performed poorly in developmental terms, some have done quite well. Third, 
recommendations for overcoming the resource curse have not generally taken into account
the issue of political feasibility. And, finally, scholars have been too reductionist in their
approaches to resource curse issues and need to focus more on understanding variation in
development outcomes between resource rich countries and the associated policy lessons.
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